A long established distinction exists in developmental psychology between young children's ability to judge whether objects are seen by another, known as ''level-1" perspective-taking, and judging how the other sees those objects, known as ''level-2" perspective-taking (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981a; Flavell, Flavell, Green, & Wilcox, 1981b). Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, and Bodley Scott (2010) provided evidence that there are two routes available to adults for level-1 perspectivetaking: one which is triggered relatively automatically and the other requiring cognitive control. We tested whether both these routes were available for adults' level-2 perspective-taking. Explicit judgements of both level-1 and level-2 perspectives were subject to egocentric interference, suggesting a need for cognitive control. Evidence of unintentional perspective-taking was limited to level-1 judgements.
Introduction
In order to predict and explain the behaviour of others in even simple social environments it is often necessary to take into account their perspective on the world. People's actions are dictated by their goals and intentions, which in turn are dictated by beliefs and desires, any of which may diverge from our own. Cooperating and competing with others regularly requires representation of these perspectives. One case where such situations arise is in taking visual perspectives. Developmental psychologists have argued that perspective-taking is fundamentally different at two levels (Flavell et al., 1981a; Flavell et al., 1981b) . Young children successfully understand whether someone sees something or not (a level-1 perspective) before they understand how something looks to them (a level-2 perspective). In the current paper we test whether the cognitive characteristics of adults' perspective-taking are similarly divergent and discuss the implications for how we understand the impressive performance of infants on some perspective-taking and theory of mind tasks (Luo & Baillargeon, 2007; Onishi & Bailargeon, 2005) .
The traditional method for testing perspective-taking involves using direct measures. Participants (often children) are asked to assess the perspectives of others and either report this perspective or make judgements about what a character will do given that they hold a specific perspective. For example, Piaget and Inhelder (1956 ) asked children to report how an array of three mountains would appear to an experimenter and Masangka et al. (1974) asked children to judge whether someone sat opposite them would see a picture of a turtle as being the right way up, or upside down. Although tasks vary in difficulty, these direct measures all suggest that perspective-taking is relatively taxing for young children. Interestingly, children's errors are ''egocentric", reflecting overapplication of their own perspective (Flavell et al., 1981a; Flavell et al., 1981b; Piaget & Inhelder, 1956) . Overcoming this egocentrism is thought to be crucial in the development of perspectivetaking (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956 ) and continues to be taxing, even for adults (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004a; Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004b; Kessler & Thomson, 2010; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003; Michelon & Zacks, 2006; Nickerson, 1999) . Taken together, these findings support a view of perspective-taking as an effortful process.
Recent research in infant (Onishi & Bailargeon, 2005; Sodian, Thoermer, & Metz, 2007; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007) and comparative (Clayton & Emery, 2007; Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2001; Santos, Nissen, & Ferrugia, 2006) psychology has suggested that, under certain circumstances, perspective-taking might not be so difficult after all. Indirect measures, monitoring eye gaze and other spontaneous behaviours, seem to show that infants http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.12.010 0010-0277/Ó 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
